Computing is not about physicality-it's about imagination.
W
hen he left his job, Don didn't quite convince me that he was about to devote his retirement to the study of quantum computing. "I've become fascinated with the subject," he exclaimed as he packed away his books. I didn't doubt his sincerity, but I also knew he was building a new house just a few minutes from the marina where he kept his sailboat. As our conversation drew to a close, he handed me a paper about quantum-computing devices. "It's a very simple introduction," he assured me, "because it's based on obvious physical principles."
Of course, "obvious physical principles" aren't important in any form of computing. Computing is not about physicality-it's about imagination. It dwells in the land of axioms and symbols that hold only the meanings we assign to them. If computing required us to understand physical principles, only physicists would do computation.
When I was taking my rst computation lessons, a well-meaning friend of my father's argued that I needed to learn the electronics of the ip-op, a computing element that could store a single bit of information. I submitted but saw no connection between his circuits and my programs. To me, data was a nonmaterial entity that could represent a spacecraft, a musical note, or even a pair of sandals that could help an explorer ip-op through vast amounts of information.
The quantum-computing paper was an earnest attempt to provide a physical basis for quantum computing. It argued that quantum computing is based on ideas that aren't commonly found in our daily experience but could be understood with a sketchy explanation of quantum physics. As I read the quick, incomplete description of electron spin, I concluded that the authors were looking down when they should have been looking up. We've trained two generations of programmers whose technological provenance is steeped in lessons from video games. Those games take place in an imaginary world that's quite di erent from the world in which we live, yet gamers are able to comprehend these ctional worlds without lessons in quantum or astrophysics.
Although we don't need to describe new machines in terms of their underlying physics, we've often found it di cult to avoid physical descriptions. For almost years, physicists have been tightly connected to highperformance computing-a combination that has produced many computing innovations. These physicists provided a small but highly attentive audience for technical descriptions of specialized computers. So, for the one company with a commercial quantum computer, D-Wave, perhaps we can forgive its need to explain the physics behind its machine.
In fact, the D-Wave machine isn't a full quantum computer but a rough beast that has much in common with the hybrid digital-analog machines of the s. These machines combined a digital central processor with an analog machine that could quickly solve integral, di erential, or linear equations. Programmers could do most of their work on the digital processor. They'd prepare their system of equations with a conventional program, map them onto a data structure, and then make a request of the analog processor. The analog processor would solve the problem and return a data structure, which would then need to be interpreted by the main processor.
Rather than solving a system of integral equations, the D-Wave machine solves an optimization problem. Again, programmers have to create a data structure to describe the problem, make a request of the quantum processor, and interpret the results. To create that data structure, programmers need only to understand the underlying rules of the machine-they don't need to base that understanding on the model of quantum physics any more than I needed to understand a ip-op to grasp the power of symbolic computation.
A ny successful form of computing eventually grows away from its physical foundations. It hides physical details and imagines the kind of world we wish to create. We'll know that quantum computing has succeeded when it presents a computational model that sparks the imagination but bears only a slight resemblance to the physics model that shares its name.
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